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Introduction 
 
Plato‟s Republic remains one of the foundational works in Western political philosophy.  
One of the main reasons for this is that the dialogue addresses topics essential to the legitimacy 
of any state.  What is “justice”?  What are the effects of “just” and “unjust” actions? 
In the Republic the main antagonist for Socrates was the sophist Thrasymachus.  In 
addressing the question of “effects,” Thrasymachus suggested that there are material rewards 
from “injustice” in business, taxes, and in politics.
1
  In politics, the most “unjust,” the tyrant, will 
have the greatest material well being.
2
  Socrates responded to this assertion by claiming the 
superiority of transcendental values as he sought to demonstrate that “reason” and the quest for 
“knowledge” cannot be satisfied by material comforts and the sensual pleasures they bring.  In 
 
 
2 
building a case for practical side of transcendental rewards, much of the Republic seeks to offer a 
response to the claims of Thrasymachus
3
.    
The bulk of this paper, however, will focus on the discussion between Thrasymachus and 
Socrates over the definition of “justice.”  As Hanna Pitkin correctly concluded, Socrates‟ 
definition of “justice” claimed that „justice is everyone doing what is appropriate to him.‟
4
 
However, the idea of “appropriateness” is not a satisfactory solution unless there is a background 
against which the “appropriateness” of actions can be judged.  “Justice” as “appropriateness” 
only has meaning if the validity of the ontological and epistemological structures used to make 
determinations of “appropriateness” can be established beyond question.  If that foundation is 
suspect the entire content of the “ideal state” is incoherent. 
This paper will present a poststructuralist reading of the exchange between Socrates and 
Thrasymachus over the definition of “justice.”  It will be argued that the assertions of 
Thrasymachus have some elements that parallel the claims of contemporary poststructuralist 
philosophy.  In addition, the claims of Thrasymachus regarding the relationship between power 
and the ability to define the “just” also resemble the assertions of poststructuralism.  A 
poststructuralist reading of this exchange suggests that by rejecting the doctrine of the forms, the 
fixed identity of the “soul,” and the “naturalness” of Socrates‟ social hierarchy, Thrasymachus 
had taken the first step toward a comprehensive critique of power - the distinction between state 
power and the formation of a normative system that legitimates its use. 
For Thrasymachus, subjects act “justly” when they comply with the commands of their 
rulers.
5
  Therefore, the definitional content of “justice” is produced by the social/political system. 
 It is not a transcendental product.  As such, “justice” is a contingent, historical phenomenon.  It 
 
 
3 
is relative to the constellation of power that defines the “just.”  “Justice” cannot be separated 
from the application of power that its practice legitimates.  For Thrasymachus, “justice” could 
only be determined in relation to the system of political power found within the state.  By 
denying the possibility that any “ideal” statement about “justice” can take place outside of a 
discursive universe that is dominated by power, Thrasymachus occupied the only possible 
remaining space: that “justice is the interest of the stronger.”
6
 
 
I. A. The Column: The “Doctrine of the Forms” 
 
According to Jacques Derrida, Western philosophy has sought to create a strategy for the 
representation of “truth” that is anchored in a system of “verification” independent of the 
“shadow” of sense impressions and randomness of purely “subjective” thought.
7
  In the Platonic 
dialogues this goal was satisfied by the “doctrine of the forms.”  The concept of “forms,” as 
unchanging, ideal, and universal “being” provided the cornerstone of the epistemological and 
ontological systems outlined by Socrates.  “Being” is the subject of knowledge, 
8
 and “being” is a 
quality that can only be applied to that which does not change.  What is immediate and open to 
the senses is subject to transformation.  Sense impressions are not the true subjects of 
“knowledge.”  The term “knowledge” can only be appropriately applied to that which is  
absolute.
9
 
The metaphysical assumptions in the epistemology of the “forms” makes the Socratic 
ideal of “justice” possible.  The doctrine of the forms provided the column that supported the 
intricate and interconnected claims about human nature, political hierarchy, and the way to 
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“knowing.”  It is the foundation for the “proof” of the immortality of the soul and the mind/body 
dualism that makes the reason/emotion distinction possible.  It is also the underlying element in 
the critique of writing, the assertion that knowledge is remembering, and the conclusion that for 
the good of the state, are must be censored.  Only if there is a “form” that contains unchanging, 
universal truth can the idea of an “absolutist” critique of practice be intelligible. 
Socrates sought to provide for this possibility through the construction of a system of 
“knowledge” that makes such absolutes the “true” reality.  He created this foundation by seeking 
to demonstrate the distinct, separable, and hierarchical nature of mind and body.  In the Phaedo 
Socrates asserted that for knowledge to be possible the mind and the body must be separate.  The 
mind attains “true knowledge,” knowledge of the unchanging forms, only after death.
10
  For 
Socrates, such a claim is necessary in order to complete the logical connection between the 
concept of “forms,” as the transcendental signified, and the power that Socrates wants to grant to 
human intellect.  The mind must have some familiarity with the absolutes in order for it to 
critique that which is changeable.  However, the “forms” represent the “true reality,” not sense 
impressions.  Empirical representations of this “realm of forms” are imperfect, temporary, 
images of the pure, infinite, and universal state of “being.”
11
 
Only in “reflection” does the soul get a clear image of things.
12
  This is the case because 
the world of sense impressions is subject to change.  Therefore, sense impressions cannot be 
trusted.
13
  How, then, would it be possible to make universal statements regarding judgments of 
beauty, goodness, and justice, unless that knowledge was prior to the confusing and “impure” 
phenomenon of the senses?  Universals cannot be deduced from the senses, nor can they be 
inductively generated from the senses and still remain “universals.”  Therefore, for Socrates to 
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grant universal status to the forms they must exist prior to the senses.  And, in order for human 
beings to have e access to the idealizations, Socrates asserts that the soul is reborn with a faint 
memory of its unity with the universal.
14
  With the recollection of the pure form of “being,” the 
imperfect world can be ordered in relation to that universal.
15
 
According to Socrates, one can come to an understanding of the forms from the use of 
“dialectical” reasoning.  The dialectic engages our desire for “knowledge,” by the process of 
continually questioning the premises of all discourse.  The dialectic raises our “understanding” to 
a perception of “absolute being” by always moving discourse toward the unity of “being” and 
“knowing” in the realm of the forms.
16
  Only when the soul has endured the light of “being” can 
the soul be turned from the shadows.
17
  When the mind has an understanding of the pure form, it 
is able to order the world according to the pure form of being.
18
 
 
B. The Ax: The Poststructuralist Critique of the “Transcendental Signified” 
 
Much of the poststructuralist interest in Plato has focused on the role the dialogues have 
played in establishing a foundation for the Western conceptualizations of “knowing.”  Plato is 
seen as an early purveyor (if not the “origin”) of a system of conceptualization in which the 
“sign” seeks to capture “being” by its transmission.  In that sense, the Socratic argument goes in a 
circle.  If you accept any of the assumptions the others follow.  If you do not, the system 
collapses. 
This reading of the Socratic position suggests that the realm of pure being must first be 
assumed in order for any of the Socratic “proofs” to be effective.  In contrast to the choice 
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between no knowledge and the ontological dualism suggested in the Phaedo, the poststructuralist 
position would claim that:‟either “knowledge” must be kept in quotation marks in order to 
demonstrate its contingent and historical nature, or it must be dependent upon a speculative 
metaphysics that attempts to “prove” its universal nature through the presupposition of its own 
being.‟  In the former case, the idea of Knowledge is abandoned to the idea of “knowledges.”  In 
the latter, the conditions for “knowledge” are presumed and the use of this presupposition is 
treated as sufficient to validate its “being.”
19
 
This notion, that the presuppositions necessary for “knowledge” constitute a “proof” of a 
claim to “knowledge,” is challenged by the poststructuralists.  From Plato to Husserl idealization 
has as its meaning the simultaneous confirmation of objectivity and interiority, one by the 
other.
20
  From this point of view, the circular nature of Socrates‟ argument becomes apparent.  
The assumption of “forms” reinforces the notion of an objective column of “being” around which 
text can be generated.  The generation of text from “being” reinforces the text of “being” within 
the column of “truth.”  If, however, the column has no being, then the text of Western 
metaphysics revolves around a column which is itself not there.
21
 
According to Michel Foucault, Socrates exemplified the Greek search for “nomos,” the 
order that is the “order of the universe,” that “being” from which all temporal “knowledge” 
springs.
22
  The classical system presupposed an order to nature.
23
  It provided names that 
conferred “being” on the objects of this orderly universe.
24
  However, stressing the structure of 
empirical inquiry (“episteme”) out of which “knowledge” is created (rather than “discovered”), 
Foucault argued that it is important to distinguish between “knowledge” and the rules that govern 
its acquisition.
25
  Applied to the Socratic enterprise, Socrates was establishing a system for 
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acquiring “knowledge” as he set the boundaries for what is to be included and excluded from 
consideration in the domain of knowledge.  It is only the process of establishing a closed 
epistemological framework that makes the acquisition of “knowledge” possible. 
Socrates can only assume that the column has “being.”  And, if the same column that 
supports the doctrine of “forms,” also supports the mind/body dualism inherent in the Socratic 
conception of human nature, as it is the necessary condition for the immortality of the soul, the 
Socrates admits that his “proof” is lacking.
26
  Even if immortality of the soul cannot be proven, 
Socrates claimed that belief in this doctrine is useful for the “effect” it has on the people.
27
  This 
statement can only mean one thing.  The social function of “truth” is more important than the 
truth value of “truth.”  It is here that the column begins to collapse.   
If Socrates admits that he cannot prove the interrelated claims of “forms,” “immortality,” 
and “ontological dualism,” he cannot exclude the empirical from the ideal.  As claimed by 
Foucault, the important question is not what something “is,” but how it operates.
28
  And, if that is 
the case, the social function of the Socratic metaphysics cannot be ignored.  The doctrine of the 
“forms” cannot be separated from the system of power that it makes possible.  Socrates may have 
admitted that his wisdom comes from the admission of his ignorance, but that does not negate the 
fact that there are social consequences from the metaphysical claims that he sought to 
demonstrate. 
Foucault‟s point in The Order of Things is that the system used to order and classify 
contains meanings and hierarchies that are not given a priori, but are historically and culturally 
determined.
29
  It is this historical-cultural order that establishes the empirical order.  Foucault 
stated, that at any given historical period there is one “episteme” that defines the condition of 
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knowledge for that age.
30
  Since the time of Plato, the concern for the conditions of discourse 
represented by the sophists, of which Thrasymachus was one, has been gradually replaced by the 
Platonic ideal of true and false discourses.
31
   
How has the power of this discourse come to dominate the discourses on “knowledge,” 
“being,” and “justice,” if it is not demonstratively “true?”  In his work Dissemination Jacques 
Derrida examines both the form of cultural transmission and the content of the Socratic 
enterprise.  To Derrida, culture represents a “text” that is neither true nor false.  Texts establish 
the preconditions for discourse.  In that sense, all textual systems are supported by some 
metaphysical assumptions.
32
  The problem, from Derrida‟s perspective, is that the postulation of 
a realm of “forms” in the Socratic epistemology, no less that the “ding an sich” in Kant, creates a 
closed structure of identity in which “truth,” and “being” reside. 
In contrast to the transcendental signified that has supported Western philosophy since 
Plato, Derrida suggests that “identities” cannot be closed.  In the form suggested by Socrates, the 
text defines identity, which seeks to recreate the presence of “being.”  Language is directed at the 
task of representing the world.  In this way two tasks are simultaneously achieved.  The identity 
of objects is secured through their correspondence to the transcendental signified.  Secondly, the 
space for the identity of “subjectivity,” as the one who speaks of “being,” is reinforced in the 
process of identifying objects. 
Derrida suggests an alternative strategy for reading that does not allow for the closed 
formalization of texts.
33
  The significance of this strategy is that it denies the possibility of 
asserting universality in claims regarding social and political “truths.”  Central to this position is 
the concept of “dissemination.”  If the transcendental signified does not lie behind positive 
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assertions to “truth” then all texts only refer to other texts.
34
  Texts reproduce and disseminate 
themselves in a process by which validity comes from the “traces” of previous texts that they 
contain.  As texts reproduce themselves, repetition becomes the source for the illusion of 
universal validity.
35
  The column of this “truth” then supports the “frame” of representations, the 
historically contingent discursive structures that substitute for “being.” 
If Socrates was engaged in “dissemination” rather than capturing the outline of “universal 
being” then the conclusions he reached about “justice” cannot be supported.   If “justice” means 
doing what is “appropriate,” and the judgment of “appropriateness” is the result of cultural, 
historical, and economic variables, then Socrates‟ assertions regarding “justice” cannot represent 
universal propositions.  In the Gorgias, this problem is identified by Callicles, as he stated to 
Socrates, “...you drag us into these tiresome popular fallacies, looking to what is fine and noble, 
not by nature, but by convention.”
36
  In the language of the poststructuralists, in order for the 
Socratic assertion regarding justice not to collapse into ambiguity and tautological nonsense 
Socrates must be able to establish a strategy which validates the transcendental signified that 
serve as the validating foundation underlying his claims.
37
  Instead, all that Socrates had done is 
to link metaphor to metaphor, heaping “traces” upon “traces,” as if the validity of the present 
traces is secured by the previous traces they contain.  This strategy is precisely the one which 
“deconstruction” seeks to unmask as it reveals the “illusion of autonomy” in discourse.
38
  The 
result is that the authors and readers of a cultural “text,” of which the Socratic notion of “justice” 
is one example, have no fixed place, no background, from which to judge the validity of the 
“text.”
39
 
The Socratic notion of “justice” hypothesizes a fixed universal form.  Thrasymachus, on 
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the other hand, indicates that the specific determinations of “just” and “unjust” are relative to the 
institutional form in which the determinations are made.
40
  If the determination of “just” and 
“unjust” are not universal but relative to “institutional” conditions, then even the narrow claim of 
Thrasymachus, that “justice” is determined by the interests of the government
41
 may be read as 
reflecting an epistemological challenge to the doctrine of the forms. 
Socrates was clearly aware of the stakes in his discussions with Thrasymachus and the 
other sophists.  If “being” cannot be pinned down then truth appears to shift ground.  This would 
lead us to believe that nothing is stable and that both sides of an argument could be true.
42
  If one 
takes the prescription in the Phaedrus at face value, that no one should speak without “truth,” the 
political prescription is clear.  Only those who share the Socratic onto-theology of “being” should 
be allowed to speak.
43
  The same rationale applies to the censorship of all “discordant” texts 
found in the Republic. (see the Republic, Book Two and Book Ten.)   
Socrates understood what the sophists meant; without the transcendental realm of the 
forms all that remains is “text.”  Speaking text tot text, Socrates called “rhetoric.”  Rhetoric 
engages the type of words where meaning “fluctuates.”
44
  To the sophists and the 
poststructuralists, both of whom see the historical character of texts, the meaning of the words 
will change because the substance of the context from which words derive their meanings will 
change.  There is nothing other than rhetoric. 
 
II.A.The Frame: Ontology and Epistemology in the Form of Subjectivity 
 
The doctrine of the forms provides both an ontological and an epistemological foundation 
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for Socrates‟ representation of “subjectivity.”  “Truth,” “beauty,” and “justice” have absolute 
forms that provide the foundation for judgements about the empirical world.  However, Socrates 
ascribed “absolute being” to something that is a component of the complete human being.  To 
that part of eternal “being” which is shared by humans Socrates applied the term “soul.”  While 
the body is a necessary “condition” for physical movement, it is the soul that animates it.
45
   
However, if the soul is eternal then Socrates‟ characterization of it must constitute a universal 
statement regarding the nature of human “subjectivity.” 
The soul of human beings is immortal, endlessly reborn in the cycle of bodily birth and 
death.  Having been united with “absolute being” at the passing of the body the soul has a 
recollection of those absolutes after rebirth.
46
  The body is, therefore, a prison for the soul.
47
  It is 
responsible for the distortions, confusions, and appetites that plague human existence.
48
  Service 
to the appetites of the body causes lust, war, revolutions, and the degradation of the state. (see the 
Phaedo, and Book Two of the Republic.) 
Socrates described the soul as having four faculties: “reason,” “understanding,” “faith or 
conviction,” and “perception.”
49
  Arranged hierarchically, reason is the highest.  Reason is 
presented as the soul dialectical power, the force that contemplates “being” in the realm of 
absolutes.  “Understanding” also does not directly rely on sense impressions, but its domain is 
the abstract and hypothetical.
50
  To Socrates the hypotheses of math and science are subsumed 
under this category.  “Faith” is that which an individual believes to be true.  However, given that 
the source for this belief is not contemplation of the absolute, but the sensations that come from 
the body, faith only represents the “shadows,” the appearance of truth, not truth itself.  The final 
faculty, perception, Socrates associates with sensation, that quality of cognition given by the 
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senses. 
In addition to the four faculties of the soul, Socrates asserted in various places in the 
dialogues that the soul has three parts
51
 or three principles.
52
  In the Phaedrus the soul is 
described as being like two parts “steeds” and one part “charioteer.”  The charioteer is to control 
the drives for glory and uncontrolled gratification.
53
 
In the Republic, however, the political significance of the triadic division of human nature 
manifests itself in a prescriptive hierarchy.  “Justice” in the state parallels the just order of the 
elements of the soul in the individual.
54
  When Socrates spoke of the “soul” having three 
different elements, his statement of the “natural condition” provided a basis for creating the 
“just” organization of elements found in any state.  The three elements of the soul, “reason,” 
“passion,” and “appetites,”
55
  require an organizational hierarchy in order for the state to achieve 
its telos.  Reason gives “wisdom,” the characteristic that is most valued in ruling.
56
  Passion 
provides courage, honor, and commitment, the characteristics best ascribed to a class of warriors. 
 Finally, the appetites generate the desire for material possessions and gratification of the needs 
and desires of the body.  The human soul directed by appetites will be the merchants and artisans 
in the Socratic state. 
From these three elements of the soul spring different priorities in the conduct of state 
rulership.  Rule by honor and courage alone brings “Timocracy,” an imperfect form of 
government which is characterized by too much ambition and conflict.
57
  Rule by the people of 
appetites brings disorder to the city by suggesting that all are “equal” in spirit because of their 
equal need for the necessities of the body.
58
  Rule by the demos will result in a disorderly state, a 
place where appetite rules principle.
59
  Only where philosophers, as those whose intellectual 
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power can dialectically commune with pure “being,” have the power to rule can the “natural” 
order of human beings be reflected in the natural order of the state. 
In order to be “just” the state must reflect the natural order of “being.”  Socrates‟ 
argument is simple: that because only the philosopher is aware of all three elements of the soul, 
and because only the philosopher controls the “steeds” in his/her being through the use of reason, 
only the philosopher is fit to rule.  Establishing a hierarchy that places contemplation of “form” 
at the pinnacle of human activity carries with it a “natural” hierarchy in politics. 
 
II.B. The Fire: The Poststructuralist Critique of “Subjectivity” 
 
From the perspective of poststructuralism, ordering and classifying gives shape and 
meaning to the world.  But this knowledge is “created,” it is not something that is discovered.  
Therefore, contrary to the Socratic view, the “grid” that allows for the classification of objects is 
not a priori.
60
  If there is not “column of being” in the doctrine of “forms” there can also be no 
fixed definition of “subjectivity” as the foundation for political practice.  Human beings are made 
“subjects” by historical contexts.
61
   
If the “truth” of the forms cannot be proven, the real question regarding forms concerns 
the “function” that this concept served in the system of thought outlined by Socrates.  For the 
discussion of “justice” in the ideal state the static notion of “forms” provided the epistemological 
foundation for a stable concept of human “subjectivity.” A stable human identity provides the 
frame upon which a “natural” order for the society can be constructed.  However, without the 
stability of the “forms,” as an epistemological precondition for a notion of “subjectivity,” any 
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conception of the “subject” is tentative and unstable. 
If “truth” was not the outcome of the Socratic investigation of “being,” “subjectivity,” 
and politics, then another question needs to be addressed.  If Michel Foucault is correct, that the 
“subject” is constituted within a system of power relations, then the question for inquiry concerns 
the type of domination that is replicated and reinforced by a system of fixed identities.
62
  From 
Foucault‟s perspective, a genealogy of the power relations established by the dialogues will 
uncover the only substance that can be revealed by the text.  The “function” of the discourse on 
human activity is revealed as the maintenance of a text on human beings that will both stabilize 
“identity” and serve as the preconditions for the creation of other texts about human behavior. 
The problem that emerges is touched on by the poststructuralists in a variety of writings.  
The central issue, however, remains the same.  Establishing a “fixed identity” for human beings 
as the “natural” order of being is epistemologically indefensible.  If “subjectivity” reflects 
conditions that are historically contingent, no fixed and eternal definition of “subjectivity” is 
possible.  In the political arena, the extent to which “subjectivity” provides the frame for the 
creation of “constitutions,” “collective punitive statutes,” and “policy actions,” the foundations is 
poured onto a shifting ground.  The very attempt to establish fixed forms that represent the “order 
of the universe” will create a totalizing political discourse that must repress all alternative 
discourses on the subject.  The process of creating a definition of human “subjectivity” provides 
the basis for establishing “normal” and “abnormal” patterns of behavior, sets the boundaries for 
what is “acceptable” as “truth” within the discourse on human beings, determines the parameters 
of identity and non-identity for “objective” study, and fixes a hierarchy as the “natural” condition 
of order.  The constitutional structures, legal statutes, and collective action taken by the 
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“legitimate” government can be brought to bear on any alternative discourse.  Power creates a 
“totalizing discourse” on the “subject.”  This total view then serves to mask repression.
63
   
The text on “subjectivity,” however, is not sufficient to establish the “truth” of any 
particular definition of the subject.  If the metaphysics outlined by Socrates does not represent 
“truth,” a condition that even he seems willing to admit, then what function does it serve?  The 
identity of the subject, coupled with the idea of the soul‟s immortality, establishes a theological 
presence from which to exercise power.  The truth of the transcendental “being” reflected 
through the human subject infuses the acts of subjects with the authority of universal “truth.”
64
  
The aim of poststructuralism, as discussed by Derrida, is to prevent any concept of “being” from 
governing from a theological center.
65
 
 
III.A. The Performance: Justice as the “Natural Order” of Human Relationships 
 
The strategy of the Republic is to reveal the content of eternal “justice” when applied to 
human affairs.  The existence of the eternal form of “justice” is a precondition for the definition 
of “justice.”  Socrates‟ conclusion was that each should have an “appropriate” place within the 
hierarchy.
66
  However, without a definition of “appropriate” the Socratic formulation is reducible 
to tautological nonsense.  Any conception of “justice” that is not based on the universal form of 
“justice” must be mere illusion.
67
 
As Socrates stated repeatedly throughout the dialogues, there is a difference between the 
“idea” and the things to which “ideas” are applied.  In applying the idea of “justice” to the whole 
society, Socrates concluded that the “well-ordered” state represents “justice.”
68
  In order to be a 
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“well-ordered” state human associations must represent a “natural” order.  Evil and injustice are 
doing what is not “natural.”
69
 
To Socrates the appropriate metaphor for establishing what is “natural” in the state can be 
found in the already established hierarchy found in the human character.  “Justice” is the 
institution of the “natural order” in the state as in the soul.
70
  In the state, those who are governed 
by the lower instincts, the “appetites,” constitute the bottom of Socrates‟ “natural” order.  For 
these people, “justice” requires that they are the artisans, producers, and merchants.
71
  Superior to 
this class, are the class of people who are driven by “passion,” “honor,” and “courage.”  For these 
individuals the “natural” order suggests that they become warriors.
72
   
Ruling the ideal state, however, requires a special class of people.  These individuals, the 
“guardians,” have capacities that are qualitatively distinct and superior to the other classes of 
people in the Socratic formulation.  In the character of the guardians, reason is the strongest 
attribute.  When the soul has reason it lifts itself from the darkness of the cave, into the light of 
pure “being.”  Only the persons of reason can apply “justice” because only they can understand 
the universal form of “justice.” 
Much of the Republic focuses on the care that must be given to the selection and training 
of the guardians.  The earliest training must be in gymnastics and music.  The physical strength 
of the body must be developed, as must the knowledge of harmony be learned in order for the 
soul to see the harmony that underlies all things.
73
  However, innovations in musical harmony are 
to be resisted because of the danger that this may pose for the entire state.
74
  As education 
continues the most promising students are taught math and science.  In this way they come to 
some “understanding” of the world, the arts necessary for warriors.
75
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“Understanding,” however, is not “knowledge.”  As training continues a few will be 
noticed as having a special talent.  These future guardians will then be trained in the “dialectic.”  
The “dialectic” is a term used to describe a method of thought.  It raises the “understanding” of 
the world to the level of “knowledge” through the contemplation of pure “being” and the unity of 
all things.
76
  By the application of “first principles” to the particulars of empirical reality the 
guardian rises above the contemplation that is clouded by sense impressions.  Only then can the 
mind descend back into the realm of the shadows without being subject to the power of their 
illusion.
77
  It is only after the contemplation of the first principles that the individual is capable of 
critique, criticism, and the wisdom to apply the universal of “justice” to the events of human life. 
The dialectic, however, is a danger in the hands of all those not of such intellect and 
disposition.  The study of the dialectic must only be open to a very small class of individuals that 
have excelled at all the other aspects of their training.  Students of the dialectic are “lawless.”
78
  
Such a mind will question moral principles, civil legislation, and the legislators that have written 
it.
79
  In the hands of a person who does not first understand the ideal harmony of nature and the 
perfect form of “justice,” the dialectic will bring skepticism, disrespect, and chaos.  An 
awareness that an ideal form of “justice exists is the only protection from the disorder potentially 
generated from the dialectic. 
At most, it can be said that the Socratic concept of “justice” represented in the Republic 
was defined as „the harmonious union of diverse and distinct elements, each having their place in 
the “natural” hierarchy.‟  Therefore, the Republic does not really define “justice,” except in this 
limited sense.  The Republic‟s purpose was to define a mechanism by which the exercise of 
power can be rationally applied in the establishment of a social hierarchy.  That application of 
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power, however, is irrational if the hierarchical distinction among subjects cannot be 
demonstrated to qualify as something that is unchanging, pure, permanent “being.” 
There is no doubt that the Republic sought to realize the “Socratic ideal” in human 
relations.  To that end, Socrates outlines a structure of the state that, he claimed, reflected the 
universal “form” of “justice.”  For Socrates, once established, the exercise of state power was 
justified in order to maintain this “natural order” in the name of “universal truth and justice.”  
Good rulership, after all, will require lies.
80
 
 
III.B. The Yoke and the Chain: The Rhetoric of “Justice” as the Technology of Power 
 
Rule will require lies.
81
  But what is rulership if the entire system created by Socrates is 
built upon a “lie”?  If the doctrine of the forms is treated as onto-theological speculation rather 
than the foundation of “truth,” is the mechanism Socrates described for finding “justice” still 
valid?  If the triadic representation of the soul is an interpretive pass at comprehension rather 
than a reflection of fixed and universal “subjectivity,” can the hierarchy and domination 
suggested by this system by “justified”?  All of Socrates‟ answers are open to question once the 
status of the “transcendental signified” is questioned. 
To state this problem in a slightly different way, Socrates never demonstrates that he has 
moved beyond rhetoric, even though he repeatedly suggests rhetoric‟s dangers.  In the Phaedrus 
Socrates described rhetoric as the influencing of minds with words.
82
  Rhetoric shifts ground and 
misleads people.
83
  Rhetoric changes the meaning of words like “just” so that no universal 
application of “justice” is possible.
84
  It is against the charge of engaging in rhetoric that Socrates 
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defends himself in the Apology.  Socrates states that he has never engaged in the practice of 
making the „weaker argument the stronger.‟
85
   
However, if the system elaborated by Socrates represents a tentative impression, then he 
did not escape from the realm of “rhetoric” into the realm of “being.”  Instead, he engaged a 
circular rhetorical strategy, using metaphorical language intertextually in order to demonstrate 
“truth.”  All that Socrates could “prove” with this tactic was that each aspect of his thinking was 
linked in strategic ways to his foundational presuppositions.  That product does not constitute a 
proof of anything. 
According to Michel Foucault, the most important issues regarding the relationship 
between state action and determinations of “truth” do not involve the determination of “true” and 
“false” in the political arena, but the function served by “truth” in collective action.  The battle is 
not over what is “true” and “false” but the rules that determine how such determination are 
made.
86
  The form taken by “justice” is a product of the rules governing the discourse on 
“truth.”
87
  Therefore, “truth” cannot be considered outside of structure of power which 
determines what is and is not acceptable discourse.
88
  It is precisely the rules governing discourse 
that Socrates sought to control. 
From the perspective of the poststructuralists all political systems, including the Socratic 
one, should be examined for the type of domination their structures make possible.
89
  On the 
most basic level, the structure of “subjectivity” outlined by Socrates rationalized the disciplinary 
power of a class that has adopted a “form” of speech, reflection of the transcendental signified, 
over classes that are not so wise as to “know” the existence of universal forms.  All that are 
outside of the system of truth production suggested by the onto-epistemological strategy of 
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Socrates will “require” the application of the state‟s disciplinary power.  Once individuals have 
been “represented” and classified in relation to “pure being,” they can be made objects of 
political repression.
90
 
The Socratic system rationalizes disciplinary power over all who do not follow it in order 
to assure that its “purity” cannot be challenged.  That requires the control over the production of 
all cultural “text.”  Music must be controlled in order to generate “harmony.”
91
  Mothers and 
nurses must only be allowed to tell the stories to children that have been “authorized.”
92
  Art 
must be censored in order to reflect the “universal” forms of beauty.  Poetry must show the 
courage in the face of death in order fro soldiers not to fear battle.
93
  Euripides must be banned.
94
 
 Religion must be controlled in order for the gods to appear only virtuous.
95
  Finally, immigration 
to the city must be controlled so that alternative systems of “truth” production can be excluded.
96
 
 All of this in a society that reflects the “natural order”? 
The doctrine of the forms has the political function of making this form of disciplinary 
power “rational” in the hands of the state.  Power creates the system of knowledge production 
that makes its appearance in the form of “universals.”  But according to Foucault, intellectuals 
are not the bearers of universal truth, but persons occupying a specific position in the functioning 
of the apparatus for “truth” production.
97
  This is a position of power.  Therefore, the exercise of 
power cannot be separated from the production of knowledge. 
When coupled with the hierarchical definition of “subjectivity,” the “right” to any form of 
antidisciplinary speech could be legitimately denied to anyone except the very few at the apex of 
the political/intellectual pyramid.  But further, through the control of what Derrida calls the 
“cultural archive”
98
 the voice to speak is also denied.  The censorship of text within the Republic 
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is both the means and the result of the exercise of power.  By controlling the metaphors used in 
the production of texts, grafts, and textual scissions, textual dissemination could only reflect the 
dominant system of thought.  In the case of the Platonic dialogues, this means that all discourse 
would all take place using the metaphors of the “transcendental signified.” 
If the “ideal state” was established, that which is arbitrary and historically contingent 
would appear natural and harmonious.  Direct political repression would not even be necessary 
because there could be no voice in which the alternative thought could be spoken.  There could 
be no political influence that did not reflect the “legitimate” form of discourse sanctioned by the 
state.  The circular logic underlying the state apparatus cannot be challenged.  That leaves only 
the hands of power to determine who is empowered to speak. 
When taken as a whole Socrates finds himself in a paradoxical situation with regard to 
the claims of Thrasymachus.  In a state which is governed by an intellectual meritocracy, where 
the “wisest” have the power to apply their understanding of what is “just” and “unjust,” has 
Socrates not come to the position of Thrasymachus?  Has “justice” not been determined 
according to the interests of the stronger?  The implication of the Socratic program, including the 
doctrine of the forms, the dialectic, and the natural hierarchy of human beings, suggests that 
anyone who does not adopt this foundational strategy is “unwise” and therefore not fit to 
participate in governing.  If “fitness” to rule is only established under the strict outline suggested 
by these assertions, Socrates has not established anything except a rationalization for totalitarian 
political practice.  Thrasymachus is, therefore, vindicated.  Justice is the interest of the stronger.  
In the Socratic state, that means “justice” is defined by those who control the mechanisms of 
“truth” production and sanction the “appropriate” forms of textual dissemination. 
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IV. The Voice 
 
Book One of the Republic opens the discussion on “justice.”  After Socrates dismisses the 
arguments of Cephalus and Polemarchus the attention turns to Thrasymachus.  When asked to 
respond to the question regarding the nature of “justice” Thrasymachus replies that “justice is 
nothing else than the interest of the stronger.”
99
  As Socrates begins to question this statement 
Thrasymachus immediately draws examples from the different forms of governments.  “[T]he 
different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to 
the several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the 
justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a 
breaker of the law, and unjust.”
100
   
In drawing the link between “justice” and the form of constitutional structure 
Thrasymachus was suggesting that “justice” is relative to the particular definitions of the 
“subject,” norms of discourse, and instruments of discipline that both support and reflect the 
system of power within the state.  This is true for the Socratic state as well as the forms tyranny, 
aristocracy, and democracy. 
The “system of „justice‟” exercises power in the form of establishing the rewards and 
punishments for actions that conform or fail to conform to the established norms of behavior.  
The critical question, however, remains.  If the foundational premises on which the Socratic 
definition of justice relied cannot be substantiated, on what basis is the “practice” of exercising 
“justice” to be based? 
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By placing the statements of Thrasymachus within the anti-foundational context of 
poststructural analysis, it is possible to move beyond a definition of “justice” that is simply 
relative to constitutional forms.  From the view of poststructuralism, all constitutions promote 
the “truth” of a particular form of “subjectivity.”  In the Republic the definition of “justice” is 
contingent upon a “universal” definition of “subjectivity.”  This strategy of “aggregation” is 
necessary in order for the coherent exercise of control.  As Derrida states, “objectification” is the 
essential first step in the application of disciplinary power.
101
  Taking a broad understanding of 
this concept and applying it to the statement of Thrasymachus it can be argued that „justice is the 
interest of those who control the discourse on the subject.‟ 
Denying the possibility of foundational support for a universal definition of the “subject” 
Thrasymachus was forced to return to the question of power.  His conclusion was that a norm is 
called “just” only when the content of that norm is supported by the disciplinary power of 
enforcement.  Denying the universality of “justice,” indicates that what the state calls “just” 
varies, based on the particular content of “subjectivity” that predominates.
102
 
In the references made by Thrasymachus, democracy, aristocracy, and tyranny establish 
systems of “justice,” rewarding and punishing behavior based on the view of the “subject” they 
contain, that makes those forms of domination “rational.”
103
  Thrasymachus recognized that the 
judicial system established in any state will be relative to the structure of power within the state.  
The judicial system is, therefore, an edifice based on the exercise of power and the definitional 
content of “subjectivity” that makes its exercise of power rational.  The state, and its judicial arm, 
does not administer abstract, universal, “justice.”
104
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Conclusion 
 
The central question of the Republic is “justice.”  However, the discussion of “justice” is 
only conceivable if the possibility exists for the identification of “just” acts.  If, however, the 
definition of “justice” requires the column of truth, the transcendental signified, and the existence 
of the “forms,” all of which are speculative, then the “natural subjectivity” that must underlie any 
abstract notion of “universal justice” is also open to challenge.  If there is no foundational 
support for defining the subject there cannot be a natural, universal form of hierarchy, 
domination, and “justice.”  Deconstructing the ontological and epistemological foundations that 
support the Socratic definition of “justice” leaves only rhetoric in support of the arbitrary 
exercise of power.  All that remains is „the interest of the stronger.‟ 
In asserting the link between power and “justice” it is not necessary to conclude that 
Thrasymachus was arguing in favor of power.  Nor can it be argued that he sought to provide 
support for the arbitrary exercise of power.  To the contrary, by asserting that power is what 
remains after the mask of “subjectivity” is stripped away from the rhetoric of “justice‟ 
Thrasymachus provided the preconditions for a critique of power.  Like Foucault, Derrida, and 
other poststructuralists, the assertion that “justice” represents power rather than “truth” provides 
the first step in the strategy of resistance.  This position is in contrast to Socrates, who was 
willing to die to sustain the power of the state and capitulate to the “idea” of masters, even if the 
acts of the masters were described as “unjust.” 
Through defining the content of subjectivity, then enforcing that content through a system 
of “justice” the state transforms human beings into the agents of power.
105
  It is, therefore, the 
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power to enforce definitional contents that should be resisted.  To that end, Thrasymachus 
presents the first step to a critique of power, the recognition that the exercise of power lacks any 
connection to an abstract, universal conception of “truth.” 
Admittedly, there are places in the dialogues where Socrates seemed to indicate some 
understanding of that position.  In both the Phaedo and the Republic he acknowledged that the 
“function” of his system of “knowledge,” “truth,” and “justice” may be more important than the 
value it contains as “truth.”  Maybe, therefore, he did not believe the tale being spun throughout 
the works. Socrates wanted us to follow, whether or not he is telling a lie and, in the process, he 
wanted to take the tools away from us to critically examine his statements.  If that is the case, in 
the final analysis Socrates has contradicted his own definition of a philosopher.  He has 
demonstrated that his love for order is far superior to his love for truth.  After all, his guardians 
are to be lovers of the state. 
 
 
 
 
 Derrida, Jacques.  1976. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  1978. Writing and Difference.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  1981a. Dissemination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  1981b. Positions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  1982a. Margins of Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  1982b. “Sending: On Representation.” Social Research. 49:294-326. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. 1984. “No Apocalypse, Not Now.” Diacritics. Summer 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1971. “Orders of Discourse.” Social Science Information 10(2):7-30. 
 
 
26 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1973. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
New York: Vintage Books, Random House. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1977. (Bouchard, Donald F., ed.) 1977. Language, Counter-memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault.  Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge. New York: Pantheon. 
 
Hamilton, Edith and Cairns, Huntington. (editors) 1989. Plato: The Collected Dialogues. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Pitkin, Hanna. 1972. Wittgenstein and Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Plato. 1955. The Republic. (Jowett Translation). New York: Vintage Books, Random 
House. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
. Plato, 1955, p. 27-28. 
 
2
. Plato, 1955, p. 28. 
3
. Socrates even appeared to acknowledge the empirical nature of this exchange between “ideal” 
and “real” when he sought to quantify the amount of unhappiness visited on those who act 
unjustly. See Book Nine, p. 342. 
4
. Pitkin, 1972, p. 169. 
5
. Plato, 1955, p. 19. 
6
. Plato, 1955, p. 19. 
7
. Derrida, 1982, p. 93. 
8
. Plato, 1955, p. 209. 
9
. Plato, 1955, p. 213. 
10
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 49. 
 
 
27 
                                                                                                                                                             
11
. This idea is exemplified in the Syposium, where Socrates states that beauty is something 
different than that which makes it visible (Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 563.) and in the Phaedo 
when Socrates suggests that there is a difference between objects that appear equal and the idea 
of equality. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 56. 
12
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 48. 
13
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 48. 
14
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, pp. 86-88. 
15
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 58. 
16
. Plato, 1955, p. 278-280. 
17
. Plato, 1955, p. 258. 
18
. Plato, 1955, p. 266. 
19
. This is, of course, the same strategy followed by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason. 
 
20
. Derrida, 1982, p. 93. 
21
. Derrida, 1981a, p. 352. 
22
. Foucault, 1986, p. 203. 
23
. Foucault, 1970, p. 303. 
24
. Foucault, 1970, p. 120. 
25
. Foucault, 1986, p. 200. 
26
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 94. 
27
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 94. 
28
. Foucault, 1981, p. 45. 
29
. Foucault, 1973, p. xviii. 
30
. Foucault, 1973, p. 168. 
31
. Foucault, 1971, p. 25. 
 
 
28 
                                                                                                                                                             
32
. Derrida, 1981b, p. 24. 
33
. Derrida, 1981b, p. 45. 
34
. Derrida, 1981a, p. 292. 
35
. Derrida, 1981a, p. 292. 
36
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 266. 
37
. To use the language of Kant, Socrates needs to produce the “synthetic apriori.” 
38
. Derrida, 1981b, p. 49. 
39
. Derrida, 1981a, p. 297. 
40
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 588. 
41
. Plato, 1955, p. 20. 
42
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 72. 
43
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 506. 
44
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 509. 
 
45
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 80. 
46
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, pp. 59-60. 
47
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 66. 
48
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 66. 
49
. Plato, 1955, p. 253. 
50
. Plato, 1955, p. 243. 
51
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 499. 
52
. Plato, 1955, p. 344. 
53
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 500. 
54
. Plato, 1955, p. 150. 
 
 
29 
                                                                                                                                                             
55
. Plato, 1955, p. 159. 
56
. Plato, 1955, p. 159. 
57
. Plato, 1955, pp. 294-300. 
58
. Plato, 1955, pp. 311-320. 
59
. Plato, 1955, p. 312. 
60
. Foucault, 1973, p. xviii. 
61
. Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 208-209. 
62
. Foucault, 1980, pp. 95-96. 
63
. Deleuze in Foucault, LCP, pp. 208-211. 
64
. The concept of an “eternal soul” in the writings of Socrates serve the same foundational role 
that such an idea has in Christianity or in other religions. 
65
. Derrida, 1981b, p. 14. 
66
. Plato, 1955, pp. 133-134. 
67
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 51-52. 
68
. Plato, 1955, pp. 129., 139. 
 
69
. Plato, 1955, p. 149. 
70
. Plato, 1991, pp. 160, 162, 165. 
71
. Plato, 1991, p. 159. 
72
. Plato, 1991, p. 159. 
73
. Plato, 1991, p. 118. 
74
. Plato, 1991, p. 134. 
75
. Plato, 1991, pp. 264-285. 
76
. Plato, 1991, p. 252. 
 
 
30 
                                                                                                                                                             
77
. Plato, 1991, p. 278. 
78
. Plato, 1991, p. 286. 
79
. Plato, 1991, p. 287. 
80
. Plato, 1991, p. 181. 
81
. Plato, 1991, p. 181. 
82
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 506.   
83
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 506. 
84
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 508. 
85
. Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p. 5. 
86
. Foucault, 1980, p. 132. 
87
. Foucault, 1986, p. 203. 
88
. Foucault, 1980, p. 131. 
89
. Foucault, 1980, p. 96. 
90
. Derrida, 1982, p. 317. 
91
. Plato, 1991, pp. 73-74, 100-102. 
92
. Plato, 1991, p. 72.  
93
. Plato, 1991, p. 82. 
 
94
. Plato, 1991, p. 327. 
95
. Plato, 1991, p. 90. 
96
. Plato, 1991, p. 375. 
97
. Foucault, 1980, p. 132. 
98
. See Derrida, 1984. 
99
. Republic, 1955, p. 19.  In the translation by Paul Shorey (Hamilton and Cairns, 1989) the 
 
 
31 
                                                                                                                                                             
phrasing is; “the just is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger.” 
100
. Plato, 1955, p. 20.  In the Republic Thrasymachus was drawn into Socrates‟ rhetorical trap by 
agreeing that rulers can be “fallible.” (Plato, 1955, p. 21.)  This strategic error on the part of 
Thrasymachus allowed Socrates to establish a foundational premise, the existence of true/false, 
right/wrong, from which his critique could proceed.  Not allowing that assumption returns the 
argument to confluence of power and “justice” suggested by Thrasymachus in the discussion of 
the different forms of government. 
101
. Derrida, 1982, p. 317. 
102
. From this point of view, the outlawing of “wage labor” in the Soviet Union was not the result 
of the discovery of an absolute form of “justice.”  It was banned because it violated the culture 
“norm” being promoted by the state as the “authentic,” “natural,” form of “subjectivity.”  In the 
capitalist world, “private property” and the “natural competitiveness” of all human beings exists 
under similar conditions. 
103
. That is precisely why, for Foucault, the study of the prison is so valuable.  It is in the prison 
where the raw power that lies behind the establishment of “subjectivity” is most obvious. 
Foucault, 1986, p. 210. 
104
. Foucault, 1980, p. 102. 
105
. Foucault, 1986, p. 208. 
